First of November – time for the victory celebration. Because Putin has now lost the war at the latest. At least that's exactly how Western experts calculated and reported it. In the spring, before the summer offensive, Marcus Keupp, a military expert at ETH Zurich, explained mathematically to anyone who would listen that Russia would no longer have a single operational tank by October at the latest.

The whole thing didn't come across as a thesis, but as a fact. Backed up with accurate, hard-hitting statistics. Inventory, production and losses – a simple equation: Putin will run out of tanks in October. Whether it was wishful thinking or fake news, it was always wrong.

And Keupp is not alone. Former General Ben Hodges delivers one victory prediction after another. The reason is understandable: the population in the West should follow suit. And it is easier to motivate them with confidence in victory than with gloomy prospects. The steepest theory in the spring: Crimea could be liberated in August. After all, Hodges said “could.” Other predictions followed: the breakthrough to the sea, the collapse of the Russian armed forces. None of this happened.

The list goes on and on. In the spring, the superiority of Western battle tanks, particularly the Leopard 2 and the US Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, was invoked. Also understandable. The population in Germany was rather hesitant when it came to the question of whether heavy military equipment should be exported. Eulogies for the main battle tank also stroked the German ego. There was no evidence that the “wonder weapons” had any decisive effect on the war or even on the battle. It was previously predicted that Putin would run out of smart weapons by the end of 2022. Because the West's sanctions would cut off its defense industry from semiconductors.

The exact opposite happened. At the turn of the year, Moscow was suffering from a shortage of certain components, such as thermal imaging cameras. But the problem was solved. The country is now producing kamikaze drones on an unheard of scale, and each of these cheap drones requires chips and electronic components. Apparently they are in abundance.

It's no wonder, weapons don't need the latest generation of high-performance chips. Which shouldn't upset even the layperson. Most of the Western weapons that end up in Ukraine were built more than ten years ago. With the chips that were available at the time.

The Ukrainian summer offensive failed to show any major gains on the ground. The supposedly unmotivated Russians did not run away; the old-fashioned positioning system could not be pushed aside, as expected. It held up. Only a little more than a dozen small settlements were liberated. At one point it was possible to break ten kilometers into the Russian lines.

But that wasn't a reason to reflect either; now the narrative "yes, but at what cost" has been reactivated. Here in the variant: "Yes, the Russians are holding the position, but they are suffering unbearable losses." The fact that when an offensive is launched, the attackers approaching in the open field are in a more threatening situation than the entrenched defenders - who were also superior in artillery and air power - was overlooked.

In general, it is true that the Russians have suffered and are suffering heavy losses. But Ukraine's losses are played down as much as possible. They could dampen confidence in the West. In the storming of Avdiivka, the Russians have now lost well over 100 armored vehicles; they are being counted meticulously. At the same time, the Ukrainian positions will be bombarded with heavy bombs, thermobaric rocket launchers and phosphorus grenades - this will also lead to losses. Another example: Recently, Russia has been attacking more than 800 targets each month with reasonably accurate glide bombs. It's unlikely that they were just shooting tickets.

In these weeks the next illusion burst. The delivery of one million shells within a year from the EU was intended to break the superiority of Russian artillery. The EU's efforts were celebrated accordingly. In fact, only 223,800 units were delivered in the first half of the year. Mostly from inventory and not from production. It is currently unclear where the missing share of over 750,000 shots will come from in the next few months. And then the budget will probably have to be renegotiated. The "Welt" reported that the average price of a grenade has risen from 2,000 euros to 3,600 euros and will probably continue to rise. This means that there are far fewer pieces available for the same money.

What about Putin? North Korean leader Kim Jong Un promised Russia help and he promptly delivered. According to conservative counts, 1,000 containers with over 500,000 shells have already reached Russia - a month after the promise. The South Korean secret service even assumes that a million pieces have already been brought to Russia. It is not known how much ammunition North Korea will give the Kremlin, but Kim's arsenal is so large that he could supply millions of grenades. Only from the magazine.

In addition, the dictator could increase new production. Russia has also expanded its arms production and will continue to do so. The West must find an answer to these challenges; in the not too distant future, the stocks of old weapons will be used up. And what comes next?

This does not mean that Kiev will lose the war, but it does mean that military success - however one defines it - will be much harder to achieve than claimed. The losses will be greater, it will take longer and the West will have to help – much – more than before.

Overly optimistic forecasts are of no use to Kiev, they are harmful. The general public will only remember that these forecasts cannot be trusted. And distrust is the last thing Kiev needs now. In fact, the population must be won over to a stronger war effort. Whitewashing is the wrong approach because it is always overtaken by reality.